Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) allows a server to authenticate a user and to establish a session key shared between the server and the user just by having memorable passwords. In PAKE, conventionally the server is assumed to have the authentication functionality and also provide on-line services simultaneously. However, in the real-life applications, this may not be the case, and the authentication server may be separate from on-line service providers. In such a case, there is a problem that a malicious service provider with no authentication functionality may be able to guess the passwords by interacting with other participants repeatedly. Abdalla et al. put forward a notion of the server password protection security to deal with this problem. However, their proposed schemes turned out to be vulnerable to Undetectable On-line Dictionary Attack (UDonDA). To cope with this situation, we propose the Gateway Threshold PAKE provably secure against this password guessing attack by also taking the corruption of authentication servers into consideration.
INTRODUCTION

Background
Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) (Bellare et al., 2000; Boyko et al., 2000; Goldreich et al., 2001; Katz et al., 2001 ) is a two-party key exchange allowing users to utilize memorable passwords as secret information, where each password is shared between a user and an authentication server. Conventional authenticated key exchange protocols based on a public key cryptosystem need a key whose length is too long to remember. Since users cannot memorize such complicated information without devices, the users are unable to respond to any incident such as an emergency call unless the users have the devices. On the other hand, users can rely on PAKE protocols only with a short character string, and PAKE will also be suitable for cloud environments where ubiquitous access is important. * This work was done at NTT Secure Platform Laboratories.
There are two cases where conventional PAKE cannot be deployed. The first case is that there exists a gateway between a user and an authentication server as in a global roaming service. The global roaming is a system where a user can receive the same services from an overseas provider even if the user is located outside service areas of the provider with which the user has made a contract. For example, when receiving on-line services via a foreign access point by using borrowed devices, a user has only to enter the password registered with the user's domestic provider. In the situation where a gateway called an access point plays a role of an on-line service provider, PAKE cannot be deployed in such environments because it is assumed that an authentication server provides services in PAKE.
The second case is that there exists a malicious authentication server. Actually, European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (ENISA, 2009) pointed out that malicious providers could be a high threat with social influence. Even if a provider is honest, vulnerabilities on a system can also cause a problem such as Heartbleed in April 2014. In fact, the vulnerability of OpenSSL can cause a problem that the passwords stored in servers are leaked. ENISA pointed out that an adversary can potentially obtain the passwords of all users without authentication (ENISA, 2014) . PAKE cannot defend against such a threat because a single trusted authentication server stores all the passwords.
Abdalla et al. (Abdalla et al., 2005; Abdalla et al., 2008) proposed schemes to solve those problems. Gateway PAKE (GPAKE) is a scheme addressing the first problem and Gateway Threshold PAKE (GT-PAKE) is a scheme addressing both problems. However, their schemes are vulnerable to Undetectable On-line Dictionary Attack (UDonDA) (Ding et al., 1995) , where an adversary guesses a password in online transaction and its password guessing attack is not detected by any authentication server. In (Abdalla et al., 2008) , it is mentioned that the scheme can be modified such that the authentication server can detect on-line dictionary attacks, but the details of the modification and its security proof are not given. In their schemes, an authentication server returns a message without authenticating users, so the adversary can make unlimited attempts to guess a password. Due to the low entropy of the password, such a password guessing attack becomes a serious problem. Therefore, it is necessary to propose a new scheme that overcomes UDonDA.
Contribution
We propose new GTPAKE which has resistance of UDonDA and the corruption of authentication servers. We prove the security of our GTPAKE under standard assumptions in the random oracle model. The proposed scheme has the stronger security against a malicious provider compared with existing schemes, and a global roaming service used for users regardless of places and devices is expected as an application. Our scheme is an instantiation of GTPAKE, and the generalization of GPAKE and GT-PAKE is left as future work.
A naive extension of GPAKE does not lead to GTPAKE with the property described in Section 1.1. The reason is as follows: If one authentication server holds plain passwords as in GPAKE, the server can just compare the received password with the corresponding plain password. However, as stored passwords should be hidden from authentication servers in GTPAKE, the authentication servers cannot easily verify logins of users. To overcome this problem, we encrypt the stored passwords by a public key of the authentication servers where the corresponding secret key is shared among the authentication servers. Furthermore, in the authentication process, the servers decrypt the encrypted password partially and authenticate a user simultaneously without revealing the password itself.
We compare the proposed scheme with other existing GPAKE and GTPAKE schemes. 2 As shown in Table 1 , the computation and communication costs of our protocol are not better than those of GT-PAKE (Abdalla et al., 2005) . However, their security proof reduces to the non-standard assumptions such as the Password-based Chosen-basis Decisional Diffie-Hellman (PCDDH) assumption, which is vulnerable to some attacks (Szydlo, 2006) . Even if those flawed assumptions hold, their scheme is vulnerable to UDonDA, which is out of security model. The security of our scheme is proven in the random oracle model if the DDH assumption holds. Our scheme tolerates the corruption of some authentication servers as their scheme. Furthermore, while their scheme is vulnerable to UDonDA, our scheme is invulnerable to this attack, although our proof similar to (Wei et al., 2011) is given in the non-concurrent setting, which assumes that a new session does not begin until the previous session is finished.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we introduce some background to understand this paper. In Section 3, we define the security model of GTPAKE. In Section 4, we describe the construction of our scheme. In Section 5, we prove the security of the proposed scheme. Finally we make final remarks in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES
We show the notation and the security assumption used in this paper.
Notation. We use the following notations throughout this paper. We denote by ℤ q a set {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. x ← A represents that x is chosen uniformly at random from a set A. Let g be a generator of subgroup of order p over ℤ q and a ∥ b be a concatenation of elements a and b, which is able to be divided into the original elements. We denote by {0, 1} k a set of all binary strings of length k. Especially, {0, 1} * means a set of all binary strings of arbitrary length. A function negl is negligible if and only if for every positive inte- (Abdalla et al., 2005) . ACFP05 b corresponds to GTPAKE in (Abdalla et al., 2005) . WMZ11 corresponds to GPAKE in (Wei et al., 2011) . WZM12 corresponds to GPAKE in (Wei et al., 2012) and its computational costs are recalculated by us here. WZM13 corresponds to GPAKE in (Wei et al., 2013) . The computational costs for a user, gateway, and each authentication server are estimated in the User, Gateway, and Server columns, respectively. We use a modular exponentiation denoted as "e" because a modular exponentiation is the most expensive computation and "E" means a cost of a public key encryption. For the sake of simplicity, n authentication servers participate in the authentication phase.
In the Message column, the number of communications is shown and we evaluate a broadcast to all authentication servers as n communication costs. In the Assumption column, a hardness assumption is shown. In the Model column, the random oracle model or the standard model is shown. In the Threshold column, it is shown whether a protocol tolerates the corruptions of authentication servers. In the UDonDA column, it is shown whether a protocol can detect malicious login attempts for guessing the passwords of users.
ger c there exists an integer N such that negl(x) < 1/x c for any x > N.
We represent a user as U ∈ U, a gateway as G ∈ G and the i-th authentication server as S i ∈ S for i = 1, . . . , n where U, G, and S are the set of all users, gateways, and authentication servers, respectively. Especially, we denote by P any participant in the set of all participants P (= U ∪ G ∪ S). We call one representative of the authentication servers that communicates with a gateway a combiner C whose index is contained in the qualified index set L. The size of L is not less than threshold t. 
Security
(κ) = |Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g ab ) = 1] − Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g c ) = 1]|
SECURITY MODEL
We describe the system model and security definitions of GTPAKE, which is a protocol which allows a legitimate user to establish a session key with a gateway with the help of multiple authentication servers. At the time of authentication, a user cannot directly communicate with an authentication server. Although the communication channel between a user and a gateway is insecure and under the control of an adversary, the channel between a gateway and a combiner is authenticated and the channel between the authentication servers is secure. When an authentication process for a user (say, User A) is being processed, another login attempt from the same user (i.e., User A) is suspended until the preceding authentication process is finished. We assume a static adversary that corrupts the set of less than the threshold authentication servers before the protocol is executed.
System Model
The proposed scheme consists of the following three sub-protocols.
• Init. Given the security parameter and the setup parameters, public parameters params are outputted. Although we assume a trusted dealer distributing some parameters for simplicity, authentication servers themselves can publish parameters by using the technique of the distributed key generation (Gennaro et al., 2007) . If the numbers of authentication servers are modified, this protocol phase is executed again.
• Regi. A user registers his password with authentication servers. If all authentication servers cannot register the password successfully, then outputs an error symbol ⊥.
• Auth. The qualified servers the number of which is not less than the threshold authenticate a user.
If the user and a gateway can establish the same session key while passing the authentication successfully, then outputs a session key sk, otherwise outputs re ject.
Security Requirements
We describe the security requirements for GTPAKE. The technical details of reflecting these requirements are given in Definitions 4 and 6.
Existing Security Requirements. The security requirements for GPAKE are as follows (due to Wei et al. (Wei et al., 2011) ):
• Known-Key Security (KS). The adversary cannot distinguish a real session key from a random session key even if the adversary obtains other session keys.
• Forward Secrecy (FS). The established session key before the adversary obtains the static keys of the user including passwords are still indistinguishable from a random session key.
• Resistance to Basic Impersonation (BI). The adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate user unless the adversary obtains the password of the user.
• Resistance to Off-line Dictionary Attack (offDA). The adversary acting as a malicious gateway cannot guess a password by verifying its guess in the off-line manner.
• Resistance to Undetectable On-line Dictionary Attack (UDonDA). The adversary acting as a malicious gateway cannot guess a password by verifying its guess in the on-line manner without being detected by honest participants.
New Security Requirement. We add a security requirement necessary for the threshold setting. In GPAKE, an authentication server potentially acts only as a passive adversary, but in GTPAKE, we need to take an active adversary corrupting a set of less than the threshold authentication servers into consideration.
• Resistance to leakage of internal information to servers (LIS). The adversary cannot distinguish a real session key from a random session key and cannot guess a password even if the adversary obtains internal information of some authentication servers.
Oracles
We show the necessary oracles to define the stronger security model than that of GTPAKE (Abdalla et al., 2005) . To distinguish the session between participants, the i-th instance for participant P is denoted by
i be instances of a user, a gateway, a combiner, and the i-th authentication server, respectively. The instance of these oracles defined here reflects the state during the progress of the protocol.
Existing Oracles (Wei et al., 2011).
These oracles used in existing GPAKE are as follows:
. This query models passive attacks. The output of this query consists of the message exchanged during the honest execution in the protocol among U (i) , G ( j) , and C (k) .
• SendUser(U (i) , m). This query models active attacks against a user instance U (i) . 3 The output of this query consists of the message the user instance U (i) would generate on receipt of message m.
• SendGateway(G ( j) , m). This query models active attacks against a gateway instance G ( j) . 3 The output of this query consists of the message the gateway instance G ( j) would generate on receipt of message m.
• SendServer(C (k) , m). This query models active attacks against a combiner instance C (k) . 3 The output of this query consists of the message the combiner instance C (k) would generate on receipt of message m.
• SessionKeyReveal(P (i) ). This query models misuses of session keys which are the intermediate result calculated from ephemeral keys. If the session key for the instance of participant P (i) is not defined, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return the session key for P (i) .
• StaticKeyReveal(P) . This query models leakage of the static secrets of participant P. If P is a user, then return the password. If P is a gateway, then return secret keys for authenticated channels. If P is an authentication server, then return the encrypted passwords for all users, the share of a secret key, and other secret keys for authenticated and secure channels.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(P (i) ). This query models leakage of the ephemeral keys used by instance P (i) . The output of this query consists of the ephemeral keys of P (i) such as chosen random numbers.
• EstablishParty(U, pw U ). This query models that an adversary registers a password pw U on behalf of a user U. The users against whom the adversary has not ask this query are called honest.
• Test(P (i) ). This query models the indistinguishability of the session key of P (i) . At the beginning of an experiment the challenge bit b is chosen. If the session key for P (i) is not defined, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return session key of P (i) if b = 1 or a random key of the same size if b = 0. The adversary can ask this query only once at any time during the experiment.
. This query models secrecy of the password held by an honest user U. If the guessed password pw ′ U equals the registered password pw U , then return 1. Otherwise, return 0. The adversary can ask this query only once at any time during the experiment.
Added Oracles. We add a new oracle to adapt to the threshold setting where an adversary can obtain internal information of authentication servers by corruption.
• Corrupt(S i ). This query models intrusion into authentication servers. By asking the query at the beginning of the protocol, the adversary can take full control of an authentication server S i .
Security Definitions
We describe the security definitions of GTPAKE. The definitions here are similar to GPAKE, but the method of dealing with authentication servers is different. The Session ID (SID) and Partner ID (PID) are used to define a partner sharing the session key in PAKE. The SID is an identifier to determine a session uniquely and the PID is an instance considered to share a session key.
Definition 3. (Partnering (Abdalla et al., 2005 
For the security of session keys, an adversary can ask the Test oracle once against a fresh participant. In the following definition, the adversary is restricted such that the adversary cannot ask queries that break the security of the protocol trivially.
Definition 4. (Freshness in Session Key Security.)
A user U (i) and a partnered gateway G ( j) are fresh if the user is honest and none of the following conditions hold. In the game to prove the security of session keys, an adversary is allowed to ask the Execute, SendUser, SendGateway, SendServer, SessionKeyReveal, StaticKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal, Corrupt, EstablishParty, and Test oracles. The list of participants is given to an adversary at the beginning of the experiment. In this situation, we define Succ sks as the event that an adversary succeeds in guessing a challenge bit b in the Test oracle.
The adversary asks
Capturing Security Properties of Session Keys. As described in the condition 1 of Definition 4, KS is reflected by allowing an adversary to obtain session keys in the non-target session. As described in the condition 2, LIS is reflected by allowing an adversary to obtain internal information of some authentication servers and by prohibiting the adversary from obtaining ephemeral keys of users and gateways in the target session. As described in the condition 3, FS is reflected by allowing an adversary to obtain static keys of the users and by prohibiting the adversary from obtaining static keys of partnered gateways and the combiner. As described in the condition 4, BI is reflected by allowing an adversary to ask queries in the nontarget session and by prohibiting the adversary from obtaining the password of the target user. For the security of passwords, an adversary can ask the TestPassword oracle once against a fresh password.
Definition 6. (Freshness in Password Protection
Security.) A password of a user U is fresh if the user is honest and an adversary does not ask the following queries.
for not less than t authentication servers.
In the game to prove the security of passwords, an adversary is allowed to ask the SendUser, SendServer, SessionKeyReveal, StaticKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal, EstablishParty, Corrupt, and TestPassword oracles. The list of participants is given to an adversary at the beginning of the experiment. In this situation, we define Succ pps as the event that an adversary succeeds in guessing the password pw U in the TestPassword oracle.
Capturing Security Properties of Passwords. As described in Definition 6, UDonDA is reflected by allowing an adversary to ask the SendUser and SendServer oracles until the number of incorrect login attempts does not exceed the predetermined limit. Also offDA is reflected by allowing an adversary to obtain internal information such as ephemeral or static keys of the non-target users and a set of less than the threshold corrupted authentication servers. The corrupted combiner can disturb the communication between a user and honest authentication servers, but cannot obtain information about the password of the user. 
OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
How to Construct GTPAKE
We describe the problems and give an intuitive explanation of our construction. As described in Section 1.2, it is difficult to convert GPAKE of Wei et al.
(which is secure against UDonDA) into GTPAKE in a naive way. In addition, it seems difficult to make GTPAKE of Abdalla et al. secure against UDonDA. In their scheme, it is impossible for an authentication server to terminate the protocol when an incorrect login attempt is made because the message made by an honest user is indistinguishable from that by the adversary. In the proposed scheme, it is possible for authentication servers to compute the result while keeping a password secret by realizing decryption and randomization simultaneously. We also use a zero knowledge proof in communication among authentication servers to prevent an adversary from showing incorrect shares.
Overview of our Scheme
We describe the flow of our proposed scheme. First, a trusted dealer generates some public system parameters such as the public key pk of authentication servers. Second, a user registers the ElGamal encryption (PW ⋅ pk v , g v ) with the hash value PW of his password pw and a random number v. Third, the user sends g r /PW to authentication servers via a gateway where r is a random number. After a random number w is generated while hiding the random number among authentication servers, a combiner sends g w to the user. The user and authentication servers verify the validity of H(g rw ) with each other. The user sends g x to the gateway where x is a random number. The gateway sends g y to the user where y is a random number. Finally, a session key H(g xy ) is established between the user and the gateway.
Construction
We show our proposed scheme based on the system model defined in Section 3.1. A perspective of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 1 . First, we describe the initialization process as below. Init. Let p be a prime whose bit length is the given security parameter κ and q be a large prime dividing p − 1. Let us denote a generator of subgroup of order q over ℤ p by g. Second, we describe the registration process as below. Regi. A new user chooses a password pw U at random from a dictionary D and computes PW U = H 1 (U ∥ pw U ) by using his identification U. After generating the ElGamal encryption Enc(pw U ) = (PW U ⋅ pk v mod p, g v mod p) where v ← ℤ q , the user sends (U, Enc(pw U )) to the authentication servers. This information is stored in all authentication servers as the encryption of the password for the user U. If any problems occur, then an error symbol ⊥ is outputted.
We use the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of equality of discrete logarithm as the building block in a similar manner to Abdalla's GTPAKE (Abdalla et al., 2005) . We describe the proof system between a prover and a verifier as follows: The two generators (g 1 , g 2 ) over a group are given and let EDLog (g 1 ,g 2 ) be the language pairs (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ 2 where there exists a random number x ∈ ℤ q such that x 1 = g x 1 and x 2 = g x 2 . The prover chooses y ← ℤ q and computes y 1 = g y 1
and y 2 = g y 2 . After computing c = H 0 (q ∥ g 1 ∥ g 2 ∥ x 1 ∥ x 2 ∥ y 1 ∥ y 2 ), the prover computes z = xc + y mod q and sends (c, z) to the verifier. The verifier checks the
. Third, we describe the authentication process composed of twelve steps as below. Auth. If a processing request has come in the invalid order, the request is recorded as an incorrect login attempt and the protocol terminates. When the counter of incorrect login attempts exceeds the predetermined limit, a processing request from the gateway to a user or authentication servers is rejected.
Step 1. A user U computes PW U = H 1 (U ∥ pw U ) by using his password pw U . U chooses r ← ℤ q and computes R * = g r /PW U . U sends (U, R * ) to a gateway G.
Step 2. The gateway G sends (U, G, R * ) to a combiner C.
Step 3. The combiner C publishes (U, G, R * ) to all authentication servers. The authentication server
If the confirmation does not hold for index i, S j publishes a complaint against S i . An authentication server receiving not less than the threshold t complaints is marked as disqualified. S i receiving a complaint from S j publishes w i, j , w ′ i, j satisfying the confirmation. An authentication server publishing the complaint with values satisfying the confirmation is also marked as disqualified. According to the index set L of not less than the threshold t non-disqualified authentication servers, S i whose index is included in L computes as follows: S i computes w i = ∑ j∈L w j,i and broadcasts
If the confirmation does not hold for index i, S j publishes a complaint.
Step 4. The gateway G sends (G,C,W ) to U.
Step 5. The user U computes
Step 6. The gateway G sends (U,Com) to C.
Step 7. The combiner C broadcasts (U,Com) among S i whose index is included in the set L. S i com-
2 and a proof EDLog (F 2 ,g) (T 2,i , g s i ) . After checking the proof, S i
Step 8. The gateway G chooses y ← ℤ q and computes Y = g y . G computes K 2 = X y and an authenticator
Step 9. The user U checks the validity of α ′ by using α. U computes K 2 = Y x and checks the validity of Auth ′ by using K 2 . If one of the two confirmations is false, the user increments the counter of incorrect login attempts for G, re ject is outputted, and the protocol is terminated. 4 Otherwise, U computes a session
Step 10. The gateway G sends (U, d) to C.
Step 11. The combiner C broadcasts (U, d) among S i whose index is included in the set L. S i checks the validity of Com by using d and α ′ . If one of the confirmations is false, the authentication server increments the counter of incorrect login attempts for U, re ject is outputted, and the combiner sends (U, f ailure) to G where f ailure means that the authentication process failed. Otherwise, the combiner sends (U, success) to G where success means that the authentication process succeeded.
Step 12. The gateway G computes a session key
and sk is outputted if success is received. Otherwise (i.e., f ailure is received), the session is rejected.
Remark. We explain the reason why the proposed scheme uses the commitment scheme in Step 5 although it seems unnecessary. If a user sends α with X in Step 5 without hiding α, a malicious gateway can guess the password of a target user with a combination of the on-line dictionary attack and the off-line dictionary attack as follows: First, the active adversary chooses the random number w ← ℤ q and sends (G,C, g w ) to the user and obtains α. We note that this attack in the on-line manner is detected eventually by honest authentication servers. Second, the passive adversary chooses a password PW and checks whether H 2 (U ∥ G ∥ C ∥ R * ∥ g w ∥ (R * ⋅ PW ) w ) equals the hash value α until the password satisfying this equation (that is the correct password) is detected.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Session Key Security
We prove the security of the session key in the proposed scheme under the CDH assumption in the random oracle model. Proof. We define Succ sks in Game n as Succ sks n . Game 0. This experiment corresponds to a real attack by the adversary in the random oracle model. By Definition 5, and we have Game 1. In this experiment, we simulate the hash functions and the oracle defined in Section 3.3. We simulate the random oracles H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 by maintaining hash lists Λ 0 , Λ 1 , Λ 2 , and Λ 3 as follows:
• On a hash query H 0 (m), if there already exists a record (m, r), then we return r; Otherwise, we choose r ← ℤ q , add the record (m, r) in the hash list Λ 0 , and return r; • On a hash query H 1 (m), if there already exists a record (m, r), then we return r; Otherwise, we choose r ← , add the record (m, r) in the hash list Λ 1 , and return r; • On a hash query H 2 (m) (resp. H 3 (m)), if there already exists a record (m, r), then we return r; Otherwise, we choose r ← {0, 1} κ , add the record (m, r) in the hash list Λ 2 (resp. Λ 3 ) and return r; and Test oracles can be simulated as below.
• On a query SendUser(U (i) , * ), we proceed as follows: If a query StaticKeyReveal(U ) or EphemeralKeyReveal(U (i) ) in any instance i or a query Corrupt(S i ) for not less than t authentication servers has been asked by the adversary or G is a member of invalid gateways for which the counter of incorrect login attempts exceeds the predetermined limit or a processing request has come in the invalid order, we increment the counter of incorrect login attempts, then do nothing.
1. On a query SendUser(U (i) , start), we proceed as follows:
2. On a query SendUser(U (i) , (G,C,W )), we proceed as follows:
3. On a query SendUser(U (i) , (Y, α ′ , Auth ′ )), we proceed as follows: We check the validity of
We check the validity of Auth ′ ; If one of the two confirmations is false, we increment the counter of incorrect login attempts for G and return abort;
• On a query SendServer(C (k) , * ), we proceed as follows: If a query StaticKeyReveal(G) or StaticKeyReveal(C) has been asked by the adversary or U is a member of invalid users for which the counter of incorrect login attempts exceeds the predetermined limit or a processing request has come in the invalid order, we increment the counter of incorrect login attempts, then do nothing. In the following queries, an adversary does the process on behalf of the corrupted authentication server S j .
1. On a query SendServer(C (k) , (U, G, R * )), we proceed as follows: The uncorrupted authentication server S i broadcasts
secretly to the authentication server S j corrupted by an adversary; S i checks the validity of w j,i , w ′ j,i by using B j,k ; S i computes a share w i = ∑ j∈L w j,i and broadcasts 2. On a query SendServer(C (k) , (U,Com)), we proceed as follows: The uncorrupted authentication server S i computes
and
and a proof; S i checks the proof and computes
tion server S i checks the validity of Com; If one of the confirmations is false, we increment the counter of incorrect login attempts for U and return (U, f ailure); Otherwise, return (U, success);
• On a query SendGateway(G ( j) , * ), we proceed as follows: If a query StaticKeyReveal(U ) or EphemeralKeyReveal(U (i) ) in any instance i or a query Corrupt(S i ) for not less than t authentication servers has been asked by the adversary or a processing request has come in the invalid order, then do nothing. • On a query SessionKeyReveal(P (i) ), we proceed as follows: If the session key sk is defined for the user or the gateway instance P (i) then return sk, else return ⊥; • On a query StaticKeyReveal(P), we proceed as follows:
On a query
If P is a user U, then return the registered password pw U ; If P is a gateway G, then return a secret key for authenticated channels between the gateway and authentication servers; If P is an authentication server S i , then return the encrypted password Enc(pw) = (PW ⋅ pk v , g v ) for all users, the share s i of the secret key for P, the published parameter g s i for all authentication servers, and other secret keys for authenticated channels between the authentication server and a gateway and secure channels among authentication servers; else return ⊥; • On a query EphemeralKeyReveal(P (i) ), we proceed as follows: If there are already the ephemeral keys generated by the instance P (i) , then return the ephemeral keys, else return ⊥; • On a query Corrupt(S i ), we proceed as follows:
We 
